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Pursuant to provisions of Rule 47(c), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Smith's Management Corporation ("Smith's") files this 
cross-petition for writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the court of appeals erroneously determine that the 
trial court had erred in partially directing verdict as to activi-
ties of Smith's prior to the time it knew Mr. Burnett was commit-
ting a crime and apprehended him? 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The court of appeals opinion, Steffensen v. Smith's Management 
Corp., 172 Utah Adv. Rep 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) was issued on 
October 29, 1991 and is enclosed as Appendix A. Mrs. Steffensen's 
petition for rehearing was denied on November 19, 1991; the denial 
was filed on November 20, 1991. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioner has exhausted her remedies before the court of 
appeals, giving this Court jurisdiction to consider her petition 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991). The Court 
may consider Smith's cross-petition pursuant to the same statute 
and provisions in Rule 47, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This 
cross-petition is timely in that Petitioner filed the petition for 
Writ of Certiorari on December 18, 1991, and as required by Rule 
48(d)(2), this cross-petition has been filed within thirty (30) 
days of such filing by Petitioner. 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules perti-
nent to the question prevented for review are contained in the body 
of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Smith's accepts petitioner's statement of the case. It is 
important to note that Mr. Burnett was peacefully apprehended and 
that his attempt to escape occurred after apprehension while he 
was being conducted to the manager's office. Steffensen v. 
Smith's, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36-37. 
ARGUMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, SMITH'S OWED NO DUTY TO PROTECT MRS. 
STEFFENSEN FROM ACTS OF A SHOPLIFTER PRIOR TO HAVING 
KNOWLEDGE THAT A CRIME WAS BEING COMMITTED. THEREFORE, 
EVIDENCE OF ACTIONS PRIOR TO THAT POINT ARE IRRELEVANT 
AS TO SMITH'S LIABILITY AND WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
It is appropriate for the trial court to exclude evidence from 
the jury. E.g., Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. A 
directed verdict which precludes the jury from considering certain 
evidence and avoiding having the jury come to a conclusion 
inconsistent with established law is one such method for excluding 
evidence. A motion for directed verdict has been described as "a 
method of testing the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented." 
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 611 
(Utah 1982). In deciding a motion for directed verdict, the trial 
court must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
party against whom the verdict is directed. Id. 
2 
In a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, that the duty was breached 
and that the breach proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. 
If, as a matter of law, the defendant owed no such duty, then 
evidence related to the claimed breach is unnecessary and possibly 
confusing to the jury making it legally insufficient for consider-
ation by the jury. 
Utah law imposes no duty on Smith's prior to the time it knows 
that a criminal act is likely to occur. Dwiqqins v. Morgan 
Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991). A business owner is not an 
insurer of the safety of its business invitees. Id. 
Comment f to section 344 [Restatement, (Second) 
Torts] makes it clear that the possessor "is 
ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care 
until he knows or has reason to know that the 
acts of the third person are occurring, or are 
about to occur." (Emphasis added.) Consistent 
with our earlier cases, we follow the 
Restatement and hold that this duty exists in 
Utah, but recognize that the duty does not 
arise until the business owner knows, or should 
know, that criminal acts are likely to occur. 
Dwiqqins at 183 (emphasis in original). If there is no duty, a 
court need not address secondary issues related to the negligence 
claims. Id. 
The evidence presented at trial did not show that Smith's knew 
or should have known that Mr. Burnett was going to commit a crime. 
As far as Smith's knew, Mr. Burnett was a paying customer until 
such time as he left the checkstand area without paying, at which 
time he was immediately apprehended. As a matter of law, Smith's 
owed no duty to Mrs. Steffensen until the crime was being 
committed, at which time they apprehended Mr. Burnett. The trial 
3 
court properly held that, prior to the time of apprehension, there 
was no duty and therefore the acts prior to apprehension could not 
proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. On that basis, the 
trial court's partial verdict regarding the pre-apprehension 
conduct of Smith's employees, was directed. 
The partial directed verdict was proper in this case. A hold-
ing of the court of appeals that it is error would saddle trial 
courts with an immense burden which would limit their discretion 
in excluding evidence. Every time a trial court ruled to exclude 
evidence, a party could object that the court was improperly 
directing a verdict. It would become virtually impossible to 
exclude unnecessary or irrelevant evidence at the trial level. 
CONCLUSION 
If this Court grants Mrs. Steffensen's petition and issues a 
writ of certiorari, it must also grant Smith's cross-petition to 
fairly consider the impact of this case in its entirety. As a 
practical matter, this Court will be unable to determine that the 
court of appeals improperly applied a harmless error analysis 
without determining the root issue of whether there was error on 
which to base that analysis. 
Respectfully submitted the /* "] day of January, 1992. 
BJrfistopher A. Tolboe 
4 
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circumstances set forth in the affidavit before 
him ... there is a fair probability that contra-
band or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 
S. Ct. at 2332. Here, Buford's prior drug 
related history, the circumstances of Rodri-
guez's unwitting buy, and the presence of 
drugs and drug paraphernalia in plain view of 
police officers following forced entry under 
exigent circumstances, all set forth in the aff-
idavit, provided the magistrate with the requ-
ired "'substantial basis for ... concluding]' 
that probable cause existed." Id. 462 U.S. at 
238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332 (quoting Jones v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S. Ct. 
725,736(1960)). 
In conclusion, we find that based on the 
totality of the circumstances presented in the 
affidavit, the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for finding that probable cause existed 
for issuance of the warrant. We therefore 
affirm Buford's conviction. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. See, e.g., State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465 
(Utah 1990); Stare v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 147-48 
(Utah App. 1991), cerf. denied, __Utah Adv. Rep 
(Utah 1991). 
Cite as 
172 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a 
negligence action. Plaintiff Pearl Steffensen 
was injured in defendant Smith's Management 
Corporation's ("Smith") grocery store by a 
shoplifter attempting to flee from the store's 
management. The jury found Smith was neg-
ligent, but the negligence was not the proxi-
mate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. On 
appeal, Mrs. Steffensen asserts the trial court 
improperly: (1) ruled Smith's failure to train 
its employees as to the appropriate methods to 
deal with shoplifters or to deter shoplifting 
was not, as a matter of law, the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury; (2) charged 
the jury on the law of foreseeability; and (3) 
excluded certain expert testimony. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On March 2, 1987, Bradley Burnett entered 
a Smith's grocery store to shoplift beer and 
cigarettes. Gary Canham, the store's front-
end manager, observed Mr. Burnett take beer 
and cigarettes from the store's shelves. As Mr. 
Burnett walked toward the front of the store, 
Mr. Canham suspected Mr. Burnett might 
attempt to leave the store without paying for 
the merchandise. Mr. Canham immediately 
informed Paul Rompus, Smith's Drug King 
manager, and together the two watched Mr. 
Burnett from the office area at the front of 
the store. As Mr. Burnett walked toward the 
front of the store, he noticed the two mana-
gers and felt they were watching him. Accor-
dingly, Mr. Burnett got in line at a check-out 
stand. As soon as Mr. Burnett felt he was no 
longer being watched, he got out of line and 
walked quickly toward the door with the 
merchandise. 
The two managers then confronted Mr. 
Burnett and asked him to come with them to 
their office. As the three walked toward the 
office, Mr. Rompus called out to another 
employee at the front of the store, telling her 
to call the police. As the group reached the 
office area, Mr. Burnett turned and "broke" 
toward the exit, dropping the beer and cigar-
ettes as he ran. Mr. Rompus yelled "stop him-
-see if you can stop him," in an effort to 
engage the assistance of others. Responding to 
the call for help, another employee attempted 
to stop Mr. Burnett by assuming a football 
blocking stance in the aisle. Mr. Burnett 
dodged this employee, turning in a different 
direction, and as he did so, ran directly into 
another employee. Mr. Burnett "bounced" off 
this employee directly into the plaintiff, Mrs. 
Steffensen, who was standing at the customer 
service counter writing a check. The force of 
the collision knocked Mrs. Steffensen to the 
ground, where she struck her head on the tile 
floor. Mrs. Steffensen was taken to the hos-
pital and has since suffered severe "stroke-
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like" paralysis to the entire left side of her 
body. 
Subsequently, Mrs. Steffensen commenced 
this action against Smith, claiming Smith was 
negligent in dealing with Mr. Burnett and that 
this negligence caused her injury. At the con-
clusion of the presentation of evidence, 
defense counsel moved for a partial directed 
verdict on the grounds that Smith's failure to 
deter Mr. Burnett from shoplifting could not, 
as a matter of law, be a proximate cause of 
Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. The trial judge 
granted the motion and incorporated this 
ruling in his instructions to the jury. At the 
conclusion of trial, the judge submitted 
written interrogatories to the jury. After deli-
beration, the jury found Smith had acted 
negligently, but Smith's negligence did not 
proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injury. 
1. PROXIMATE CAUSE 
Mrs. Steffensen's first claim of error is the 
trial court improperly granted Smith a partial 
directed verdict on the element of proximate 
causation. During the trial, Mrs. Steffensen 
proceeded on two theories of negligence. First, 
Mrs. Steffensen asserted Smith had been 
negligent in failing to train its employees to 
use techniques to "deter" Mr. Burnett from 
shoplifting and, alternatively, that Smith's 
employees negligently failed to utilize these 
techniques in dealing with Mr. Burnett. 
Second, Mrs. Steffensen claimed Smith was 
negligent in chasing and attempting to stop 
Mr. Burnett after he broke away and ran. 
Mrs. Steffensen argued that both of these acts 
of negligence endangered the safety of Smith's 
customers and ultimately caused her injuries. 
At the close of evidence, Smith asked the 
trial judge for a partial directed verdict, ruling 
that as a matter of law, even if its employees 
had been inadequately trained about the need 
for deterrence and failed to utilize deterrence, 
such failure was not the proximate cause of 
Mrs. Steffensen's injury. The trial court 
granted Smith's request and instructed the 
jury that all Smith's conduct prior to the stop 
and detention of Mr. Burnett should not be 
considered by the jury:1 
You have heard testimony regarding 
events that occurred prior to the 
time of the stop of the shoplifter, 
Mr. Burnett. 
You are instructed that none of the 
actions of the Smith's employees 
prior to the stop and detention 
proximately caused plaintiff's inj-
uries. Therefore, you must not take 
this testimony into consideration 
when deliberating and making your 
decision. 
A directed verdict is only appropriate when 
the court is able to conclude that reasonable 
minds would not differ on the facts to be 
Management Corp. ~-
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determined from the evidence presented. 
Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 
652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). A directed 
verdict cannot stand when, reviewing the evi-
dence in a light most favorable to the losing 
party, "there is a reasonable basis in the evi-
dence and in the inferences to be drawn ther-
efrom that would support a judgment in [the 
losing party's] favor." Id. at 898; see Penrod 
v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987). 
Mrs. Steffensen claims the trial judge's jury 
instruction concerning pre-apprehension 
evidence was improper because reasonable 
minds could differ as to whether a failure to 
"deter" Mr. Burnett from shoplifting was the 
proximate cause of her injuries. 
In Utah, a negligence claim requires the 
plaintiff to establish four elements: that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; that 
defendant breached the duty (negligence); that 
the breach of the duty was the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injury; and that there was 
in fact injury. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 
111, 116 (Utah 1991). Proximate cause is "that 
cause which, in natural and continuous sequ-
ence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening 
cause), produces the injury and without which 
the result would not have occurred. It is the 
efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets 
in operation the factors that accomplish the 
injury." State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 & 
n.2 (Utah 1984). Further, there can be more 
than one proximate cause of an injury so long 
as each is a concurrent contributing factor in 
causing the injury. See Anderson v. Parson 
Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 
467 P.2d 45, 46 (1970); Jaques v. Farrimond, 
14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133, 134 (1963). 
It is well established that the question of 
proximate cause is generally reserved for the 
jury. Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 
541, 544 (Utah 1984); Ostler v. Albina Tran-
sfer Co, Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah App. 
1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
1990). Only in rare cases may a trial judge rule 
as a matter of law on the issue of proximate 
causation. 
This principle is illustrated by several Utah 
Supreme Court decisions. In Harris v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983), 
the passenger of a jeep brought an action 
against a bus company and the jeep driver for 
injuries sustained in a traffic accident. The 
trial court granted the bus company a directed 
verdict, instructing the jury that if they found 
the jeep driver should have observed the bus 
prior to the accident, they must find, as a 
matter of law, that the jeep driver was the sole 
proximate cause of the accident. On appeal, 
the plaintiff claimed that a jury could infer 
that the bus negligently contributed to the 
accident and pointed to allegations that the 
bus stopped too rapidly, failed to drive out of 
the lane of traffic, and had faulty brake lights. 
Id. at 220. The Utah Supreme Court agreed 
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with the plaintiff and reversed the directed 
verdict. The Harris court held it improper for 
the trial judge to have taken the issue of pro-
ximate cause from the jury. The court expla-
ined: "Where the evidence is in dispute inclu-
ding the inferences from the evidence, the 
issue should be submitted to the jury." Id. 
Likewise, in Jensen v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 
(Utah 1980), the trial judge granted defendant 
summary judgment on the issue of proximate 
cause in an action where the plaintiff had been 
injured in an automobile accident. The plain-
tiff claimed he was unable to see approaching 
traffic in executing a left-hand turn because 
a van owned by the defendant utility company 
negligently blocked his view by remaining in 
the intersection, and this was an intervening 
proximate cause of the accident. On appeal, 
the Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
summary judgment on the issue of proximate 
cause. The court held that the issue of proxi-
mate cause may only be taken from the jury 
where reasonable minds could not differ as to 
what "was or was not the proximate cause of 
the injury." Id. at 365 n.4. The court concl-
uded that "in a situation involving indepen-
dent intervening cause, the primary issue is 
one of the foreseeability of the subsequent 
negligent conduct of a third person, and in 
this case, [the issue of proximate cause] must 
be resolved by the finder of fact." Id. at 365 
(emphasis added). 
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 
240 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court's summary judgment for 
defendant on the issue of proximate causation 
because the court found no evidence of prox-
imate cause and determined that, without 
evidence, the issue would have been left to 
juror speculation. In Mitchell, dependents of a 
murdered hotel guest brought a wrongful 
death action against the hotel after the dece-
ased had been unexplainedly murdered in his 
hotel room. Plaintiffs sought to prove that the 
hotel management was negligent in its security 
measures and that such negligence proximately 
caused the murder. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's 
summary judgment for the defendant. The 
court held that because there was no evidence 
as to how the murderer entered the deceased's 
room, plaintiffs had failed to show a factual 
connection between the negligent security 
measures and the murder. The Mitchell court 
recognized that the murderer could have 
entered the room in a number of ways, many 
of which would have had no connection with 
the hotel's security measures, including by 
invitation of the deceased. Because plaintiffs 
bore the burden to show defendant's conduct 
was a "substantial causative factor that led to 
the [guest's] death," id. at 246, and because 
plaintiffs had offered no evidence other than 
mere speculation as to how the murderer got 
in the room, summary judgment on the issue 
of proximate causation was proper. 
In sum, the issue of proximate cause should 
be taken from the jury only where: (1) there is 
no evidence to establish a causal connection, 
thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or 
(2) where reasonable persons could not differ 
on the inferences to be derived from the evi-
dence on proximate causation. Robertson v. 
Sixpence Inns of America, Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 
789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1990)(en banc). 
Smith argues that its failure to deter Mr. 
Burnett could not have been the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury because 
there was not an unbroken causal line between 
this failure and Mrs. Steffensen's injury. 
Specifically, Smith argues the act of apprehe-
nding Mr. Burnett, Mr. Burnett's decision to 
run, and Mr. Burnett's physical encounter 
with Smith's employees, were, as a matter of 
law, intervening proximate causes and there-
fore broke the chain of causation flowing 
from its failure to deter. 
Smith correctly asserts that "a more recent 
negligent act may break the chain of causation 
and relieve the liability of a prior negligent 
actor under the proper circumstances." 
Godesky, 690 P.2d at 544. However, if the 
subsequent negligent act is foreseeable to the 
prior actor, both acts are concurring causes 
and the prior actor is not absolved of liability. 
Id. The issue is whether the subsequent inter-
vening conduct, either criminal or negligent, 
was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 545; Harris, 
671 P.2d at 220. "A superseding cause, suffi-
cient to become the proximate cause of the 
final result and relieve defendant of liability 
for his original negligence, arises only when an 
intervening force was unforeseeable and may 
be described with the benefit of hindsight, as 
extraordinary." Robertson, 789 P.2d at 1047.2 
The fact that the final act which produces the 
injury is the criminal conduct of a third party 
does not preclude the finding that an earlier 
negligent act was the proximate cause of 
injury if the criminal conduct was, under the 
circumstances, reasonably foreseeable. Robe-
rtson, 789 P.2d at 1047; Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 
246. 
First, Smith cannot rely on its own subseq-
uent acts of negligence to break the chain of 
causation between an earlier act of negligence 
and the injury. Only the unforeseeable acts of 
another constitute an intervening proximate 
cause. See State v. Marty, 166 Ariz. 233, 801 
P.2d 468, 472 (Ct. App. 1990); People v. 
Gentry, 738 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Colo. 1987); State 
v. Neher, 52 Wash. App. 298, 759 P.2d 
475, 476 (1988), aff'd, 112 Wash. 2d 347, 771 
P.2d 330 (1989). To hold otherwise would 
allow tortfeasors to escape liability by com-
mitting additional acts of negligence following 
an initial breach of a duty. Therefore, Smith's 
apprehension of Mr. Burnett and the subseq-
uent chase through the store did not break the 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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chain of causation 
Likewise, we are hesitant to say, as a matter 
of law, that Mr Burnett's acts following 
apprehension broke the chain of causation 
between Smith's failure to deter Mr Burnett 
and Mrs. Steffensen's injury Substantial 
evidence before the jury indicated that Smith 
could have reasonably foreseen a customer 
would be injured by a shoplifter's decision to 
run, particularly when, instead of deterring the 
shoplifter, Smith chose to "play cat and 
mouse"' with him Certainly Mrs Steffensen 
presented evidence on this theory of causation 
A closer question is whether any reasonable 
juror could conclude that the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn trom it show 
Smith's failure to deter was a contributing 
cause of Mrs Steffensen's injury 
In this case, Mrs Steffensen introduced 
substantial expert testimony that, in dealing 
with shoplifters, deterrence measures prevent 
shoplifting and thus promote customer safety 
During trial, Mrs Steffensen presented testi-
mony from security and shoplifting experts 
who testified that Smith's employees failed to 
use reasonable means to handle Mr Burnett, a 
suspected shoplifter, sufficient to protect the 
safety of the store's customers These experts 
identified two specific and generally accepted 
techniques that retail stores employ when 
dealing with shoplifters and which Smith 
failed to implement First, the experts testified 
that a retail store should take steps to "deter" 
a suspected shoplifter from carrying out his or 
her plan by taking such affirmative action as 
making direct eye contact with the suspected 
shoplifter, approaching the suspected shopli-
fter and offering assistance, and calling for 
security over the public intercom system 
Second, the experts testified that a retail store 
should also train its employees to use caie 
when apprehending a shoplifter The experts 
agreed that employees should not chase or use 
force with a shoplifter who becomes violent or 
flees. These experts testified that stores 
employ, or should employ, such techniques 
primarily to protect the safety of their custo-
mers and to prevent incidents precisely like the 
one which occurred in this case 3 In addition, 
Mrs Steffensen submitted copies of Smith's 
employee training manuals which advocated 
deterrence when dealing with shophfters 4 Mr 
Burnett was, in fact, deterred when he thought 
Smith's employees were watching while he was 
in the store. He went to get in the check out 
line and waited there until he believed he was 
not being watched. Further, Mrs Steffensen's 
experts testified that approximately five 
percent of all shophfters, when apprehended, 
run They likewise testified that the proper use 
of deterrence techniques can reduce,, this 
number by reducing the number of shophfters 
as a whole 
Thus, we are hesitant to uphold the trial 
court's ruling that, as a matter of law, 
Iv Rep 36 J? 
Smith's failure to deter Mr Burnett was not a 
contributing proximate cause of Mrs Steffe 
nsen's injury There was probably sufficient 
evidence produced from which a reasonable 
juror could infer that Smith's failure to deter 
was a negligent act,5 as it would have been 
reasonably foreseeable to an adequately 
trained employee that his or her decision to 
apprehend the shoplifter in a crowded store 
could have led to a customer's injury 
However, this does not end our inquiry If 
the trial court's partial directed verdict was 
harmless error, we need not reverse See Utah 
R Civ P 61 (1991), State v Verde, 770 P 2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989) On appeal, the appellant 
has the burden oi demonstrating an error wdi> 
prejudicial -that there is a ' reasonable lik-
elihood that the error affected the outcome of 
the proceedings " Verde, 770 P 2d at 120 
Further, in determining whether a trial court's 
error was harmful, we must look be>ond the 
mere fact of error and consider in totality all 
the evidence and proceedings below See, e g , 
Anderson v Toone, 671 P 2d 170, 175 (Utah 
1983) (erroneous jur> instruction not reversible 
error when considered in light ot all instruct-
ions and evidence) Although normally we 
would be reluctant to uphold an erroneous 
directed verdict on harmless error grounds, in 
this case we cannot ignore the fact that the 
jury's verdict would not have differed had the 
trial judge not granted Smith's partial directed 
verdict. 
At trial, Mrs Steffensen presented substa-
ntial evidence of Smith's negligence the 
store's failure to deter Mr Burnett's shopli-
fting, the negligent apprehension and holding 
of Mr Burnett, and the improper pursuit of 
Mr Burnett once he ran for the door The 
trial court's partial directed verdict removed 
trom the jury's consideration only the portion 
ol this evidence relating to Smith's actions 
before Mr Burnett's apprehension In retur 
ning a verdict for the defendant on the rema-
ining evidence, the jury found that although 
Smith had acted negligently, the negligence did 
not proximately cause Mrs Steffensen's inj-
uries Therefore, the jur> must have concluded 
that either (1) the post-apprehension negli-
gence was too attenuated and remote from the 
injury to constitute the proximate cause, or (2) 
Mr Burnett's attempt to flee was an unfore 
seeable superseding proximate cause ol the 
injury We cannot see how the jur> would 
have reached a different conclusion had it 
been allowed to consider acts Smith perfo-
rmed, or failed to perform, prior to apprehe-
nding Mr Burnett Accordingly, we find it 
highly unlikely the jury would have changed 
its proximate cause decision had the trial judge 
submitted to them the issue of Smith's failure 
to deter Mr Burnett's shoplifting Therefore, 
we find the trial court's partial directed 
verdict on the issue of proximate causation to 
be, at most, harmless error 
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II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Next, Mrs. Steffensen claims the trial court 
incorrectly stated the law with regard to for-
eseeability when it instructed the jury concer-
ning her second theory of negligence-the 
post-apprehension chase. We review challe-
nges to jury instructions under a "correctness" 
standard. See Knapstad v. Smith's Manage-
ment Corp., 774 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court's jury instruction number 
thirty-two charged the jury that: 
Foreseeability in these instructions 
means injury or harm, if any, to a 
customer which the defendant and 
its employees could have reasonably 
anticipated as the natural consequ-
ences of their actions, if any, even 
though they were not able to anti-
cipate the particular injury which 
did occur. In determining what is 
foreseeable, you must determine that 
the actions by Burnett were 
predictable by Smith's employees 
and not just a mere possibility. 
Mrs. Steffensen claims this instruction impr-
operly focused on the particular acts of Mr. 
Burnett, rather than focusing on shoplifters in 
general. We agree that the specific identity of 
the shoplifter is irrelevant to the question of 
foreseeability. See Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183 
(foreseeability that criminal act will occur 
establishes duty). However, it is unnecessary 
for us to reach the merits of Mrs. Steffensen*s 
claim because any error committed by the trial 
judge was harmless. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61 
(1991); Verde, 770 P.2d at 120 (Utah 1989). 
The question of foreseeability goes to the issue 
of negligence, and the jury found Smith neg-
ligent. Therefore, any error in defining fores-
eeability did not affect the jury's verdict. 
III. EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Mrs. Steffensen's next claim of error is the 
trial judge improperly excluded portions of her 
expert testimony. First, the trial court forbade 
one of Mrs. Steffensen's experts from testif-
ying about Smith's employee training practices 
as they related to the way its employees handle 
shoplifters. Second, the trial court did not 
allow Mrs. Steffensen's expert to give an 
opinion as to the relative proportion of fault 
between Smith and Mr. Burnett. Challenges to 
evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of 
expert testimony, are reviewed under a defer-
ential "clear error" standard. See Davidson v. 
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 427 
(Utah App. 1990). Further, an appellant bears 
the burden of demonstrating that the excluded 
evidence could have influenced the jury to 
render a different verdict. Anton v. Thomas, 
806 P.2d 744,746 (Utah App. 1991). 
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A. Testimony On Employee Training 
Mrs. Steffensen contends the trial court 
should have admitted expert testimony conc-
erning Smith's failure to adequately train its 
employees regarding the proper handling of 
shoplifters, including techniques for deterring 
shoplifting. At trial, the judge did not permit 
Smith to introduce this expert testimony on 
the grounds that Smith's failure to deter Mr. 
Burnett could not have been the proximate 
cause of the injury, and therefore the testi-
mony was irrelevant. 
Our resolution of the proximate cause issue 
relating to shoplifter "deterrence" mandates a 
finding that if this ruling was error, the error 
was harmless. Furthermore, the exclusion of 
any training evidence relating to Smith's 
employees chasing Mr. Burnett was also har-
mless as the jury found Smith negligent in its 
apprehension and chasing of Mr. Burnett. 
B. Testimony Apportioning Fault 
Mrs. Steffensen's final argument is that her 
expert witness should have been allowed to 
render an opinion concerning the relative fault 
of Smith and Mr. Burnett. Smith contends the 
trial court's ruling was correct because the 
apportionment of fault requires the expert to 
render a legal conclusion and is thus inadmi-
ssible under Utah law. We agree with Smith 
that the apportionment of fault requires a 
legal opinion and, therefore, such a determi-
nation should be reserved for the jury. 
This court recently considered the question 
of what expert opinions are permissible as 
going to the "ultimate issue,"6 and what expert 
opinions are inadmissible as "legal" conclus-
ions. See Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1230-32. In 
Davidson, we held the trial court properly 
excluded an expert opinion which concluded 
that the defendant was negligent. In doing so, 
we stated that "[qjuestions which allow a 
witness to simply tell a jury what result to 
reach are not permitted." Id. at 1231. A 
witness may testify as to the defendant's 
actions, including whether the defendant acted 
with care; however, the witness may not con-
sider all the facts and render a final legal 
conclusion. We find apportionment of fault 
between parties to be exactly this type of 
impermissible legal conclusion. It is for the 
jury to place a legal proportion on the relative 
faults of the parties. Therefore, we hold that 
the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony 
regarding the relative proportion of fault 
between Smith and Mr. Burnett was correct. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, even if the trial judge impro-
perly invaded the province of the jury by 
granting Smith a partial directed verdict on the 
issue of proximate causation, such error was 
harmless given the jury's finding that Smith's 
subsequent negligent acts were not the proxi-
mate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. 
Further, any error in defining "foreseeability" 
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for the jury was rendered harmless by the 
jury 's finding that Smith was negligent 
Finally, the trial court correctly excluded 
expert testimony which would have improperly 
rendered a legal conclusion as to the propor-
tion of fault between Smith and Mr Burnett 
Accordingly, we affirm the jury verdict for 
defendant 
Judith M Billings, Associate Presiding 
Judge 
WE C O N C U R 
Pamela T Greenwood, Judge 
Norman H Jackson, Judge 
1 Although the trial judge both granted a directed 
verdict and incorporated his ruling in the court's 
jury instructions, we conclude the ruling is most 
accurately characterized as a partial directed verdict 
A directed verdict makes a determination as to an 
element of a cause of action, and takes such deter-
mination from the purview of the jury-as was 
done here The Utah Supreme Court characterized 
the same action of a trial judge as a directed verdict 
in Harris v Utah Transit Auth , 671 P 2d 217, 219 
(Utah 1983) In Hams, a personal injury action 
stemming from a jeep bus collision, the trial judge 
instructed the jury that if they found that the defe 
ndant jeep driver should have observed the bus, 
then they must conclude, as a matter of law, the 
jeep driver was the sole proximate cause of the col 
hsion, thereby precluding liability stemming from 
the bus driver's actions Id On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that this instruction was 
in fact a directed verdict and treated it as such The 
trial judge's ruling in this case is indistinguishable 
from the ruling in Hams, and therefore we likewise 
consider the trial court's ruling a directed verdict 
and review it accordingly See aiso Cemtos Truc-
king Co v Utah Venture No i, 645 P 2d 608 
(Utah 1982Xmotion for directed verdict tests the 
sufficiency of the evidence) 
2 See also George v LDS Hosp , 797 P 2d 1117 
(Utah App 1990)(in wrongful death action, trial 
court improperly took proximate cause from jury on 
grounds that nurses' failure to notify doctors of 
patient's worsening condition was not proximate 
cause because of subsequent intervening negligence) 
3 Smith's experts also agreed that these techniques 
-deterrence and refraining from using force or 
chasing the shophfter-are valid security methods 
Their testimony, however, asserted that Smith's 
employees had been adequately trained in these 
procedures and properly followed the procedures 
during the Burnett shoplifting incident 
4 Smith's employee manuals contain statements 
advocating the use of deterrence techniques in han 
dhng shoplifters 
Make sure that employees on the sales 
floor are greeting and making eye 
contact with customers, especially those 
who are acting suspiciously Make use 
of the intercom system by calling for 
security from time to time Very effec 
tive tool, it gives the potential shoplifter 
an uneasy feeling that security is in the 
store 
Similarly, the company manuals also instruct its 
employees regarding the importance of customer 
jvianagement Corp.
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safety in handling shoplifters 
Our company policy is that no employee 
is to take any action in the apprehension 
of a shoplifter which will bring harm to 
himself, to other employees, or to cust 
omers The most important thing to 
remember about apprehending a shopl 
ifter is that we do not want anyone 
injured There is nothing in the store 
that is worth a person getting hurt for 
Use common sense, if the situation 
can't be properly controlled let the 
shoplifter go and attempt to get a license 
number 
5 We recognize the trial judge's decision finding 
Smith owed Mrs Steffensen a duty to take reason-
able precautions to protect her from the criminal 
acts of third parties was correct Since trial, the 
Utah Supreme Court has visited the issue of a shop 
owner's duty to protect customers from the criminal 
acts of third parties See Dwiggms v Morgan Jew 
elers, 811 P 2d 182 (Utah 1991) In Dwiggms, the 
Utah Supreme Court adopted section 344 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts stating landowners 
have a duty to business invitees to take reasonable 
steps to protect invitees from the criminal acts of 
third parties where such acts are reasonably forese 
eable The Dwiggms court held where a jewelry 
store had been robbed only once in ten years, a 
robberv is not foreseeable However, Dwiggms is 
distinguishable because the store in question was the 
most frequently shoplifted store in the Smith's 
chain Further, the fact that Smith's employee 
manuals advocate the safe handling of shoplifters 
demonstrates Smith did in fact, foresee such enm 
inal acts Therefore we believe the trial judge pro 
perly found that because customer injur) from 
shoplifters was torcseeable, the law imposed a dut) 
on Smith to take reasonable measures to protect its 
customers from injuries resulting from dealing with 
shoplifters See also Taco Bell, lnc v Lannon, 744 
P 2 d 43, 46-49 (Colo 1987)(store owner had a 
duty to take reasonable secunty measures to protect 
customers where store had been subject of armed 
robbery ten times in past three years)(rehed on by 
Dwiggms, 811 P 2d at 183 n 1) 
6 Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact "UtahR E\id 704(1991) 
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